Russian military analyst Andrei Martyanov said the latest Russian strike on Kyiv marked a new phase in the war, arguing that Moscow is no longer limiting itself to symbolic retaliation but is now systematically dismantling Ukraine’s military infrastructure and the NATO-supplied systems protecting it.
Speaking with host Danny Haiphong, Martyanov discussed what was described as one of the largest coordinated Russian aerial attacks on Kyiv since the start of the conflict. According to figures cited in the interview, the strike package included 351 attack and decoy drones, 25 ballistic missiles, eight Zircon hypersonic missiles, 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles, six Iskander-K cruise missiles and six Kalibr cruise missiles.
Haiphong said roughly 20 ballistic missiles were launched in a 15-minute window and that Ukrainian air defenses failed to intercept the missile portion of the barrage.
Martyanov said the scale and composition of the attack demonstrated that Russia retains deep offensive capacity despite repeated Western claims that Moscow is running out of missiles, drones or operational reach.
“This is a massive missile-aviation strike,” Martyanov said, describing it as a combined operation launched from multiple platforms, including ground systems, aircraft and the Black Sea Fleet.
The most significant element, he argued, was the use of Zircon hypersonic missiles. Martyanov described Zircon as a Mach 10 weapon that remains powered throughout its flight and approaches targets at extreme velocity, making it fundamentally different from conventional ballistic missiles.
“Zircon is an altogether different animal,” he said. “It is a Mach 10 weapon. It flies constantly under its own power. You cannot intercept it.”
According to Martyanov, the missile’s speed, maneuverability and variable attack profile leave current Western air-defense systems with no realistic interception window. He said Zircon can approach vertically or along a shallower trajectory, depending on the target and mission profile, and claimed the system has a range of roughly 1,500 kilometers.
The strike also renewed questions about the performance of U.S.-supplied Patriot PAC-3 systems. Martyanov rejected the idea that Ukraine’s problem is simply old equipment, arguing instead that Patriot and other Western air-defense platforms are structurally unfit against modern maneuvering missiles.
“These missiles from the Patriot PAC-3 — the United States provided pretty much everything it could,” Martyanov said. “It is an extremely bad complex. It is pathetically ineffective.”
He claimed Patriot systems can still engage slower, subsonic or non-maneuvering targets, but not the modern strike systems now being used by Russia.
“It intercepts something, especially subsonic and non-maneuverable targets,” he said. “Other than that, it cannot intercept modern weapon systems. Period.”
Martyanov also claimed more than $130 billion worth of U.S.-supplied air-defense systems, including Patriot PAC-3 and NASAMS, have been destroyed or neutralized by Russian strike assets during the war.
The targets discussed in the interview were not described as random civilian sites. Haiphong listed reported strikes on missile assembly and component facilities, plants involved in maintaining and repairing anti-aircraft missile systems, fuel and lubricant depots used for emergency frontline deliveries, drone and optical-equipment factories, radar-equipment facilities, armored-vehicle and munitions manufacturing sites, and shipyard-related production sites.
Martyanov said this target set reflects a broader Russian shift toward the direct destruction of Ukraine’s remaining military-industrial capacity.
The implication is severe: if Ukraine cannot protect the factories, depots, repair facilities and logistics nodes that sustain the war effort, then additional Western weapons packages may arrive into a battlefield where the support infrastructure is already being destroyed.
That point became central when the discussion turned to NATO’s reported plan for a €140 billion aid package for Ukraine, including additional air-defense interceptors.
Martyanov dismissed the package as a political gesture that cannot solve the underlying production problem.
“You don’t fight with packs of money,” he said. “They do not buy something which you do not have.”
He argued that Europe lacks the industrial depth to replace interceptors at the rate Ukraine is consuming them. As an example, he claimed Britain produces only around one Aster-30 air-defense missile per month, an amount he said would not be sufficient for even a single night of heavy combat.
The broader issue, Martyanov argued, is that NATO is attempting to finance its way out of a military-industrial crisis. Money can authorize procurement, but it cannot instantly create factories, trained workers, supply chains, missile motors, electronics, radar components or finished interceptors.
He described Western military production as trapped between political promises and physical limits.
The interview also focused on Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian fuel logistics. Martyanov said Russian strikes have been systematically hitting gas stations and fuel infrastructure, particularly along routes needed to move forces and supplies across eastern Ukraine.
“There is not a single gas station operational between Kharkov and Yavrak,” he claimed. “Not a single one. All have been taken out.”
If accurate, the implications are significant. A military can receive drones, armored vehicles, artillery shells and missiles, but it cannot maneuver effectively if its fuel network is collapsing. Destroyed gas stations, depots and fuel-distribution points can slow convoys, complicate evacuations, restrict rotations and limit the mobility of frontline units.
That is why Martyanov framed the strikes as part of a larger operational design: not simply punishing Kyiv, but weakening Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war across multiple fronts.
He also argued that the conflict should not be understood as Russia versus Ukraine alone. In his view, the war has become a direct test between Russia and the combined military-industrial capacity of NATO.
“Russia is not at war with Ukraine,” he said. “Russia is at war with NATO, the combined West.”
Martyanov said the war is exposing what he sees as a generational gap between Russian and Western military systems. He argued that the United States and NATO are still organized around weapons, doctrine and production models rooted in the 1990s, while Russia has adapted to the demands of modern high-intensity war.
“The United States operates a table of organization and equipment from the 1990s,” he said. “Russia operates the TOE from 2026.”
He pointed to air defense, standoff weapons, smart munitions, combat-management systems and hypersonic weapons as areas where he believes Russia has moved ahead. He also dismissed Ukraine’s reported “Flamingo” missile as a slow, subsonic platform that Russian air defenses can intercept.
Martyanov’s assessment was blunt: NATO can announce new aid packages, but it cannot quickly reverse the erosion of Ukraine’s air defenses, fuel infrastructure and military-industrial base.
The latest Kyiv barrage, in his view, was not merely another strike.
It was a demonstration.
Russia can launch large combined attacks.
Ukraine’s air defenses remain under heavy strain.
Western interceptor supplies are limited.
Industrial targets are no longer insulated.
And hypersonic weapons such as Zircon are forcing NATO to confront a battlefield reality its existing defenses were not built to handle.
The message from Martyanov was clear: the war has entered a phase where money, statements and promises of future production may no longer be enough.
If Russia can continue destroying the systems Ukraine needs to fight, while NATO struggles to replace them, then the balance of the war may be shifting from weapons deliveries to industrial exhaustion.
